How NATO Allies Are Closing Land Warfare Capability Gaps on the Eastern Flank

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Joanne Swann
Joanne Swann
09/22/2025

A man driving a tank

Land Warfare and NATO’s Eastern Flank

The war in Ukraine has placed NATO’s eastern flank at the centre of regional defence. Currently, this frontline is facing a number of unwelcome challenges, including conventional aggression, hybrid tactics and developing technologies – putting alliances to the test. At the heart of these efforts is land warfare: the domain of armoured manoeuvre, artillery and fires capabilities, which must be ready to adapt. Yet, while recent conflicts have highlighted the importance of land power, they have also exposed gaps in mobility, air defence and digital resilience that no single nation can address alone.[1] In order to better safeguard the eastern flank, NATO allies are actively intensifying collaboration to help strengthen collective readiness as the war continues.[2]

The Strategic Significance of the Eastern Flank in Land Warfare

The eastern flank, which comprises of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Poland down to Romania and Bulgaria, is the most exposed frontier against Russian advances - this is why it is essential to NATO’s strategic posture. As seen with recent incursions of Russian drones into Polish airspace, the eastern flank’s close proximity to active conflict reflects how quickly aggression can escalate. Incidents such as these highlight the need to modernise equipment and infrastructure to reduce vulnerability. 

For this reason, NATO’s Integrated Deterrence concept (which combines forward-deployed forces, joint operations and shared readiness among allies) is being accelerated across these states. Some of this reinforcement includes:

  • Doubling the number of multinational battlegroups on the eastern flank from four to eight.
  • Scaling up forward land forces beyond battalion-size battlegroups to brigade-size units during exercises when required.
  • Supporting combat-ready forces with rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control.
  • Creating a new NATO Force Model to provide a larger pool of available and ready forces, improving responsiveness to any scenario.
  • Developing improved logistics support to move, reinforce, supply, and sustain land forces more effectively.[3] 

A great example of this strategy in action is Lithuania’s hosting of Germany’s newly formed permanent 45th Panzer Brigade, which symbolises cohesion among allies and a commitment to strengthening regional readiness along the eastern flank.[4]

Capability Gaps in Land Warfare Exposed by Recent Conflicts

The war in Ukraine has shone a light on various capability gaps in land warfare which has rippled across NATO’s eastern flank. 

As Defence Industry Analyst Anna Miskelley explains, artillery is still essential, however counter-battery delays and supply problems have limited its effectiveness. At the same time, loitering munitions and drones are changing the way in which battles are fought as they force armies to disperse gunlines, camouflage more effectively and adapt quickly to avoid being targeted. While these weapons offer cheap precision, they also speed up counter-battery fire meaning it is harder for artillery to survive. Crucially, the integration of electronic warfare to protect against loitering munitions and drone threats remains uneven, leaving forces vulnerable if counter-drone measures are not in place.[5] These vulnerabilities are compounded by Ukraine’s current shortages in air defence munitions as U.S deliveries slow even as missile and drone attached from Russia intensify.[6]

Mobility and logistics are under pressure too. Factors such as aging infrastructure, cross-border red tape and bridge weight limitations all play a role in hampering rapid reinforcement.[7] There are also vulnerabilities concerning cyber resilience and digital command-and-control systems, as highlighted in a recent report from NATO’s Cooperative CYBER defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which explains how critical infrastructure (including logistics hubs and communications systems) is increasingly being targeted by state-linked actors.[8]

Modernisation and Technological Transformation in NATO Land Warfare

In order to better stay ahead of the curve, NATO members are actively accelerating the modernisation of land warfare capabilities. For example, air and missile defence is being strengthened via layered systems which counter long-range missiles, unmanned aerial systems and drone threats. We’ve seen this happening in Denmark, who are currently investing in intelligent ground-based air defence systems which can be networked for more resilient protection. Defence Minister, Troels Lund Poulsen, commented:

“The current security policy situation means that ground-based air defence is an absolute top priority in the rebuilding of the Armed Forces. Experience from Ukraine shows that ground-based air defence plays a crucial role in protecting the civilian population, among others, against Russian air attacks.” [9]

Autonomous platforms are also advancing fast. Increasingly, Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs) are being developed and fielded, with NATO and European research showing improved speed of deployment, use for reconnaissance, logistics, and force protection in Ukraine. More than 800 Termit UGVs have already been supplied to Ukrainian forces, demonstrating the scale and practical impact of these systems on the battlefield.[10]

Finally, NATO is investing in AI, quantum, and cyber technologies to help improve awareness on the battlefield and strengthen electronic dominance. This will mean better command and control, faster data analysis and a sharper threat detection. To make sure these tools work in practice, Allied Command Transformation is running experiments, such as AI-powered wargames and quantum sensor trials, to test new technologies in realistic conditions before they are rolled out.[11]

Strengthening Multinational Interoperability on the Eastern Flank

Building resilience along NATO’s eastern flank depends upon allies working seamlessly together during crises. This is already evident, with member states stepping up to support one another. For example, cross-border mobility and shared logistics are being practised in exercises like Grand Eagle 2025, which begun this September in Lithuania, and will train the rapid deployment of troops and equipment to strengthen command, transport and coordination between allies.[12]

Combined exercises also include Iron Wolf 2025 which took place in May. During this exercise, Lithuania’s Iron Wolf Infantry Brigade, integrated with NATO’s Multinational Battlegroup, trained alongside forces from Germany, Czechia, and Norway to strengthen planning and execution of defensive and offensive operations.[13]

Finally, partnerships with local forces (especially the Lithuanian Land Forces) do well to act as anchors of deterrence because they integrate nearby units into NATO battlegroups and enable smoother cooperation. Doctrinal alignment, joint training, and standardised communication systems are increasingly emphasised to remove friction during deployments. Political coordination supports this: initiatives like Operation Eastern Sentry (which is a NATO-led, multi-domain activity launched in response to Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace, which brought together allied air and naval assets to reinforce deterrence and strengthen air defence) make clear that allied governments are not just planning ties, but actively committing resources along the eastern flank.[14]

References

[1] Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict: Modern Warfare in the Age of Autonomy, Information, and Resilience.” CSIS, May 2, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessons-ukraine-conflict-modern-warfare-age-autonomy-information-and-resilience Accessed September 15, 2025.
[2] BBC News. “New Nato mission to bolster eastern flank after Russia drone incursion.” BBC News, September 13, 2025. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0q719qg1wko. Accessed September 16, 2025.
[3] NATO. “NATO’s Military Presence in the East of the Alliance.” NATO Topics. Updated July 2025. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm Accessed September 16, 2025.
[4] Associated Press. “Merz inaugurates a historic German brigade in Lithuania and pushes for security spending.” AP News, May 22, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/lithuania-germany-merz-nato-russia-1eb668fc6bf8a345fbd36aa3e7cdd040. Accessed September 16, 2025.
[5] Forecast International. “Ukraine War Highlights New Role for Loitering Munitions.” Defense & Security Monitor, September 5, 2025. https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2025/09/05/ukraine-war-highlights-new-role-for-loitering-munitions Accessed September 15, 2025.
[6] Ukrainian Independent Information Agency (Ukrinform/Eurointegration). “Ukraine Faces Shortages in Air Defence Munitions as U.S. Deliveries Slow.” Eurointegration, September 9, 2025. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2025/09/9/7219733. Accessed September 17, 2025.
[7] International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Military Mobility in Europe.” Strategic Dossier: Power and Policy in Europe 2025. London: IISS, 2025. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/publications---free-files/strategic-dossier/pds-2025/chapters/iiss_progress-and-shortfalls-in-europes-defence_2025_vignette_military-mobility-in-europe.pdf Accessed September 19, 2025.
[8] Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Policy Brief: Addressing State-Linked Cyber Threats to Critical Maritime Port Infrastructure. Tallinn: NATO CCDCOE, July 2025. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2025/07/CCDCOE_Policy_Brief.pdf Accessed September 18, 2025.
[9] European Defence Review. “Denmark Launches Historic Investment in Ground-Based Air and Missile Defense Systems.” EDR Magazine, September 12, 2025. https://www.edrmagazine.eu/denmark-launches-historic-investment-in-ground-based-air-and-missile-defense-systems Accessed September 15, 2025.
[10] Shephard Media. “NATO and Europe Step up UGV Efforts.” Shephard Media, July 18, 2025. https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/nato-and-europe-step-up-ugv-efforts/ Accessed September 17, 2025.
[11] NATO. “Allied Command Transformation and Innovation: Advancing NATO’s Strategic Edge.” NATO ACT, April 4, 2025. https://www.act.nato.int/article/act-innovation-advancing-strategic-edge/ Accessed September 18, 2025. 
[12] Bundeswehr. “Grand Eagle 2025.” Bundeswehr.de, September 2025. https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/news/bundeswehr-nato-train-alliance-contingency/quadriga-2025/grand-eagle. Accessed September 17, 2025.
[13] Joint Forces. “Exercise Iron Wolf 2025 in Lithuania.” Joint Forces, May 24, 2025. https://www.joint-forces.com/exercise-news/82513-exercise-iron-wolf-2025-in-lithuania. Accessed September 18, 2025. 
[14] NATO. “NATO’s military presence in the east of the Alliance.” NATO Topics. Updated September 2025. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm Accessed September 19, 2025.


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