Can Canada Recover its Submarine Fleet?

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Intense debate has erupted in recent days over the future of Canada’s submarine fleet now that all four of its vessels are officially out of action at the same time. The most heated discussions have arisen in parliament and in the press, with decision-makers having to defend the situation to both their peers and the public.

Back in 1993, having decided to discontinue production and use of Cold War era diesel-electric boats, the UK proposed the sale of its four Victoria-class subs to the Royal Canadian Navy, which was eventually accepted at CAD$750 million – including refits to meet Canadian standards.

A broken fleet on a Halifax pier: Canadian sailors on HMCS Corner Brook
salute a royal visit from Queen Elizabeth just one year ago. [image: Militaryphotos.net]

So began a long journey towards active service, during which time pipe welds were found to be at fault, interior framework corroded, air turbine pumps broken, hulls cracked, and – for good measure – high levels of lead were discovered, owing to outdated materials.

Defence Minister Peter McKay stood before the House of Commons in September to both support the need for a submarine fleet but concede that the acquisition had not been properly considered.

"No one would deny there have been challenges with respect to these submarines, which were purchased by the previous government. In fact, submarines bring an important credibility and important capability to the Royal Canadian Navy."

Going over the histories of all four vessels, it is easy for the superstitious to form an impression that the entire programme is cursed.

In 2000, the projected 3 month refit of the first boat, HMCS Victoria, instead took 3 years. After this delay, a series of further repairs continued, which included a massive renovation to the electrics after technicians apparently hooked a modern direct current feed to the outdated system, causing “catastrophic damage”. It has yet to re-enter service.

In 2004, just three days after being handed over to the RCN, crew error caused HMCS Chicoutimi to take on 2,000 litres of saltwater, which in turn sparked a huge onboard fire that gutted the inside of the vessel, killing one. The incident has effectively put the boat out of action until at least 2012.


In 2010, the Navy spent CAD$45 million on HMCS Windsor alone, $28 million over budget, having also seen heavy delays to its refit efforts of every major system. According to the local news reports, thousands of dollars went solely towards keeping pigeons away, as Windsor had spent so long in drydock.

Last June, HMCS Corner Brook (pictured) ran aground during maneuvers off the coast of Vancouver Island, resulting in the start of pre-maintenance work with the expectation of an extended maintenance programme.

"How long that process will take and how much it will cost isn't known since the amount of work varies vessel to vessel,” said Lt Heather McDonald in a press statement at the time.

“Work on each sub must be individually negotiated within a larger 15-year contract of up to CAD$1.5 billion that the Department of National Defence awarded to the Canadian Submarine Management Group in 2008.

“Given that submarines are among the most highly complex machines that exist, maintaining them is a very complex process.”

It is impossible to lay blame for the situation the Navy now finds itself in on just one factor. From bad procurement analysis, undertrained sailors and engineers, and the undermining nature of time itself, the RCN has simply suffered a series of unfortunate events.

Of course, far more importantly than laying blame is the question of how the Navy salvages the situation and can effectively and quickly secure the future of its submarine programme, be it through the restoration of the current fleet, or by investing entirely in a new one. Restoring the public’s faith in the programme would be naught but a bonus.

Officially, there are no plans to do away with the ex-British subs, despite the angry headlines. In an open letter to the Windsor Star, Vice Admiral Paul Maddison echoed McDonald’s gripe of dealing with “among the most sophisticated machines on the planet” but stuck by the schedule to begin reintroducing the refreshed vessels back to the seas from next year, while urging some perspective.

“They were acquired at roughly one-quarter of the projected cost of a comparable new build. Our operating and maintenance costs are comparable to those of other navies. Given that the boats were purchased with 80 per cent of projected hull life remaining, Canada will see a solid return on its investment well into the 2020s.”

The international industry can learn much from our friends in the north. It is notable, for instance, that despite the faults of Canada’s old leaden fleet, Britain’s sparkling new Vanguard-class and Astute-class fleets have also had their share of construction delays, random fires, rock collisions, and mechanical failures, as well as attracting vast amounts of negative press thanks to the cost of manufacture and upkeep.

The lack of contrast suggests that there is an immediate and vital need for military engineers, programme managers, and those involved in the lifecycle of such intricate naval platforms to share skills and lessons amongst their counterparts across the international community.

Contributor:   Richard de Silva

Richard de Silva reports on defence and security at DefenceIQ.com. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Creative Writing and Film and a Master’s Degree in Film from Kingston University, London.

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Report Abuse   watchkeeper 10/14/2011 11:32:51 AM EDT I am sorry to hear of the ongoing faults with these boats - but not totally surprised that they are still causing problems - as they once did in the RN, prior to being laid up. Many years ago I was part of the UK's CASAP consortium, involved with building UK Trafalgar class SSNs for the Canadian Navy. The Upholder Class demonstrated that their design, based on much SSN technology but conventionally powered , was flawed, when one of HMS Ursula's torpedo tubes remained open after being fired, taking on around 1,500 litres of sea water, before emergency surfacing. Lessons learned in 100 years of submarine building had been forgotten and fail-safe, belt and braces equipment had been superceded by more modern technical systems that enabled the outer door to remain open - while the inner door was being operated! Little wonder her crew judged her to be unsafe and refused to sail in her. Both Royal Navy and Canadian Defence officials tried desperately to downplay the incident. Instead of calling it a flood, the official spin was that the sub "experienced an ingress of water." Media reports that likened the incident to a mutiny were officially denounced as "exaggerations" by the naval PR machines! Propulsion problems reminded us that installing a French / GEC electric motor, designed for electric locomotives, was not such a good idea - as too was the choice of sonar - French again - selected, so the story goes, because the RN boffin responsible preferred his trips to Thomson in France rather than Plessey at Templecombe in Somerset UK - where all that was on offer by way of hospitality was a game of skittles and a pint of warm ale! The boats had serious design and build flaws, and major issues with spares, right from the outset. It has been said, unfairly in my view, that no institution or organisation in Canada had any experience building, refitting or maintaining modern submarines. There's an old saying, ' you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear'. If the boats were below par from the outset, it's unfair to heap blame on Canada. Having worked on both the CPF and TRUMPS projects, I can personally vouch for the high quality of Canadian marine systems engineering. Perhaps the time has come to consider scrapping them, building new boats along the lines of Sweden's excellent Archer Class. For, after all is said and done, Canada deserves a good, reliable, state of the art submarine. Three cheers for the Oberons and their Triton sonars! Replies (0) Post a reply Sign in or Sign up to post a comment