Op-ed: Britain’s failed geopolitical strategy

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For the past decade, Britain’s geopolitical strategy has been founded on remaining in close alliance with the United States, with a particular emphasis on keeping them involved in Europe. This strategy has now failed.

The basic planks of British geopolitical strategy are determined by geography. At its simplest form, it is a choice between the US and Europe. History has made Britain wary of European strength, and fierce domestic opposition to the structures of European strength – the various arms of the European Union – has made it a strikingly difficult course to pursue. Consequently, Britain has pursued relations with the US, seeking to keep them involved in Europe.

Emotional appeals

Mostly lacking the military and intelligence-gathering might to be a vital ally, Britain has often relied on emotional appeals to US leaders to sustain relevance. This strategy – epitomized by Tony Blair’s approach to Washington  has stressed historical bonds between the two nations, while offering to improve America’s global image by providing support in Afghanistan and Iraq, thereby weakening the charge that these wars were purely born of US adventurism. In addition, Prime MinisterBlair’s government assiduously cultivated warm personal relationships with both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

At times, the relationship has been based on an almost literal blood price, as Britain has sought to demonstrate the value of that emotional commitment in the number of casualties it has taken, and by pointing to the sheer level of controversy these wars have provoked as evidence of British leaders’ statesmanship. This perhaps bears in mind the US military’s quip that Australia is their closest ally, because they even fought in Vietnam. Similarly, Britain has been willing to cooperate with the darkest sides of US intelligence in the War on Terror, aiding in torture and permitting ‘extraordinary rendition’ flights to use UK facilities. This unflinching commitment to ‘stand shoulder to shoulder’ with the US in all areas has come with significant moral and human costs.

Military support

Britain’s military efforts should not be entirely disregarded. Though British troop commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan were often hefty by British standards, they were – by the standards of America’s enormous military – largely symbolic. However, certain aspects of British military cooperation are valued by the US. Perhaps most notably, the skill and commitment of British special forces is said to have been of enormous value in Iraq, where much of the Surge strategy was based on the assassination of insurgency commanders. Though Britain did not follow its own counterinsurgency doctrines (and failed in no small part because of this), Britain’s colonial experience of fighting similar wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was valuable to the US as they sought to master a tricksy form of warfare.

In other fields, Britain has also made useful contributions. Britain cooperates with the US Navy and Coastguard in combating drug trafficking in the Caribbean, and British deployments to Kosovo and as part of EUNAVFOR off the Horn of Africa have allowed the US to disregard a couple of trouble spots.

European efforts

Meanwhile, in Europe, Britain was vital in brokering the 2004 expansion of the European Union to include many Eastern European nations, and then was one of the few nations to offer unfettered immigration rights to the citizens of those nations. Several of these nations – most notably Poland and the Czech Republic – are strongly pro-America, with too-recent memories of repression by the Soviet Union in their minds. Indeed, their offers to host the controversial US anti-ballistic missile shield are an indicator of their desire to maintain US links. Much to the chagrin of Nicholas Sarkozy, this expansion significantly diluted French power, and introduced a stronger Atlanticist strain to EU decision making.

Europe, led by France, has also sought to promote military structures under the European Union. France has long been wary of US involvement in Europe, removing themselves from NATO command structures for long periods, and actively seeking alternatives. It is largely Britain’s reluctance, and continual emphasis on NATO as the proper structure for defence cooperation, that has thwarted this, and ensured that the US retains a major voice in multilateral defence cooperation in Europe.

Failure

In a unipolar world, where the US faced no credible threat, emotional appeals could work because the US had no need to be pragmatic. However, the rise of China – both its actual military rise, and its rise in the minds of US officials and officers – has meant that the US must once again be pragmatic in its military deployments.

In this new pragmatic paradigm, Europe is insufficiently important to the US, and simultaneously too much trouble. Russia is not much of a threat, and there is little immediate prospect of war in Western Europe. Meanwhile, the US is at times baffled by the ins and outs of European politics. Moreover, Europe is, in the US’ estimation, quite wealthy enough to pay for its own defence. What Britain offers in return for US involvement – smallish military commitments (that in Basra and Helmand, arguably had to be rescued) and international respectability – is not enough to outweigh this.

At the same time, Britain, having brokered Eastern European expansion, has failed to maintain those ties. Ministers from these countries expressed surprise at Britain’s quid pro quo approach to negotiations. As a result, Britain blew its chance to manufacture an Atlanticist coalition in Europe.

New directions

The January 2012 US defence review confirmed the US’ reorientation towards the Pacific, a reorientation which has long been telegraphed by Robert Gates, Hilary Clinton and President Obama. Bases in Europe will be closed.

Now, therefore, Britain must confront the failure of its Atlanticist strategy. It has been unable to keep the US significantly involved in European affairs, and it cannot count on US support in protecting its interests. Perhaps the clearest signal of this was Hilary Clinton’s suggestion that the Falklands conflict might be anything less than a settled issue. If Britain cannot count on unequivocal support in an issue of no consequence to the US, then it surely cannot count on such support on issues where the US stands to lose out.

Britain must therefore seek new alliances. Some of this work has already begun, with a defence cooperation treaty with France. Similar efforts should be made to cultivate relations with Turkey and with Poland. The emphasis must ultimately be on a web of flexible alliances with middling powers, which cumulatively offer something of the support, at a lower cost, of alliance with the United States.

Tom Wein writes for the Defence Dateline Group

Contributor:   Defence Dateline Group

Defence Dateline Group

Internal UK and European defence analytics

For military decision makers, industry stakeholders and the fighting men and women of Europe, understanding the state of European defence is a top priority. In this regular column, the Defence Dateline Group will explore Europe’s defence dilemmas: asking the tough questions, shining a light on the biggest issues and providing you with the “food for thought” you need to tackle the challenges ahead.

The Group

Tom Wein – Editor

Tom is a defence industry and strategy analyst with experience in the Middle East and strategic communications. He has worked as a project manager for Strategic Communication Laboratories, and published numerous policy papers and articles.

Robert Knapp – Columnist

Robert is a regular foreign affairs and defence contributor to BN magazine, with his principal areas of focus being naval strategy, European defence procurement and 20th century maritime history.

Laurence Conneely – Columnist

Laurence is currently studying for an MSc in Violence, Conflict & Development at the School of Oriental and African studies, with a particular focus on contested governance, geopolitics and insurgent & separatist movements across the Indian Subcontinent, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

David Moroz – Columnist

David is a former RAF reservist and War Studies graduate. His areas of interest include air power, British defence policy and the Second World War in Europe.

You can contact Defence Dateline Group and its members here.

Report Abuse   ddolan 02/01/2012 9:41:58 AM EST Britain's policy could hardly be called a failure. The U.S. is Britain's natural ally for historic, political and cultural reasons. The British people don't like European politics any better than than Americans. Recently, the E.U. has demanded fiscal control of national budgets. The U.K. will never stand for a loss of sovereignty like that! So, if Britain wants to return to a go-it-alone stance, they will need a strong ally. Guess who? Replies (0) Post a reply Sign in or Sign up to post a comment