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Sea Viper Air Defence: Where is the Venom in the Royal Navy’s Missile System?

Contributor:  Nick Young
Posted:  01/04/2011  12:00:00 AM EST  |  0

Rate this Article: (4.5 Stars | 8 Votes)

Tags:   frigate | destroyer | air defence | missile | Royal Navy | maritime | Type 45 | Sea Viper | radar | SAM | BAE

 
If one paid any heed to media speculation of its reported failures, lack of integrated British technology and limited system capability, it would be easy to conclude that Sea Viper is the only viper without venom or British ingenuity. The objective of this article is not to set the record straight, but to discuss the press claims and consider just how effective Sea Viper is as an air defence system. 
 
Unpacking the technical verdict
To appreciate the failures reported in the media, it is important to understand what ‘failure’ means. For any system, there are two fundamental types of failure: systemic and non-systemic. The latter refers to failures in equipment or components based upon an overall failure probability. No component will continue to work indefinitely, and all will have a life-defining failure probability. Generally, the more malignant the operating conditions, the shorter the respective life span. Arguably, any complex weapon system, by its very nature, will operate in non-benign conditions and therefore, all such systems are subject to probability in their overall ability to operate. 

Designers always attempt to mitigate or reduce these failure probabilities; however, all components will fail eventually. Hence, while non-systemic failures are undesirable, they will always occur. Therefore, component failure rates require consideration during the design phase, but are not indicative of systems capability. This being said, if such a failure occurs at a greater than anticipated rate, it then becomes a systemic failure necessitating the modification of the design. Other non-systemic failures are unachieved design implementations (i.e., built incorrectly), which are, more often than not, failures in manufacturing. 

Systemic failures are much more of a concern as they indicate one of two possibilities – the original customer requirement was wrong or the implementation of that requirement was wrong. In any event, both are expensive to resolve and will almost certainly be indicative of systems performance (or lack of). However, systems engineering processes, such as ISO 15288, include a phase of activities called ‘qualification’. The raison d’être of the qualification phase is to ensure the system in question meets the requirements.
 
The verification of the system against its requirements is via one of four methodologies: Inspection, Analysis, Demonstration and Test, or a combination of these methods. As part of this process, imperfections or questionable results are expected, requiring deep analysis, interpretation and understanding. Even where a failure does occur, data accrued can still be used to verify the system. 

To say that the Sea Viper programme was full of failures is not entirely accurate. Part of the objective of the qualification phase is to iron out and tune the relevant systems to achieve optimum system performance. Some of the trial failures were opportunities to optimise the overall system capability. This is exactly what these occasions allowed and those involved worked upon this assumption.  Summing up, practically all of the failures were non-systemic, while the remainder related to system optimisation. 
 
Defining production sources
On the question of indigenousness, Sea Viper is not entirely homegrown, but nor is it entirely a foreign system. The fact is almost all modern system development around the world includes technologies from a variety of countries. The constituent system elements of Sea Viper are:

• Sampson multi-function radar (MFR)
• Command & control (C2)
• Sylver Missiles launchers
• Aster 15 & 30 missiles

Within the Sea Viper system, the primary enabling elements are the Sampson MFR and the C2. Each of these elements breaks down into constituent sub-systems, which decompose further, all the way down to individual components, printed circuit boards etc. The source of these low-level components can be anywhere on the globe (e.g. integrated circuits from China).  However, the key to the system design does not relate to the method or source of the parts making up the system, but to the principle of the design, the enabling algorithms and the selection of implementational technology. 

Sea Viper development dates back to the 1980s, with various development routes in terms of sensor technology (e.g. multi-function electronic scanned adaptive radar (MEASAR)) and the advanced algorithms supporting the system. The defence evaluation and research agency (DERA) and its preceding and following organisations, which were entirely British, conducted the majority of this development of Sea Viper enabling technologies, from technology readiness level (TRL) 0 to 6, in conjunction with Roke Manor and what is now BAE Systems Integrated Systems et al. 

There is no denying that the Sylver launchers and the Aster 15 and 30 are not of British design, but rather the responsibility of their design and development lay with the French arm of MBDA (and its predecessors). However, at the time of selection, the Aster missile was the most effective SAM available in its class by the virtue of the on board seeker and its manoeuvrability. However, the technology transfer and cost benefits can still be realised within the British economy by virtue of BAE Systems third share in MBDA. 

The implementing organisations were predominately British, with the UK arm of MBDA being overall responsible for the Sea Viper system, while BAE Systems were responsible for design, development and testing of the Sampson radar. Hence, the principle design behind Sea Viper is inherently British; however, as acknowledged, the implementation of the enabling technology takes on a more global outlook. 
 
Defending against the ASM
For clarification, the primary purpose of most naval air defence systems is for defending against anti-ship missiles (ASMs). Aircraft are much easier targets from a technical perspective. Hence, the measurement of an air defence system’s capabilities is subjective, with a number of available attributes for measurement purposes. The list below is probably not exhaustive, but hits the highlights of a system’s expected comparison attributes:

• Overall number of SAMs
• Available SAMs on/in launcher
• Available fire control channels
• Maximum engagement range of the SAMs
• Air picture compilation
• Maximum track numbers
• Ability to engage low-level targets
• Ability to engage high manoeuvring targets
• Ability to engage small targets
• Ability to engage such targets in a high clutter environment

The first four of these are straightforward to establish, but the rest are not so easy. The average number of surface-to-air-missiles (SAM) on major naval platforms (i.e. frigates and larger) is 42 against 48 for Sea Viper. However, the average number of SAMs available in/on the launcher ready to fire is actually 24 against 48 for Sea Viper, primarily because ~60% of air defence systems rely on trainable launchers. Trainable launchers, by their nature, normally require reloading and have a reduced reaction time relative to vertical launchers. 

The average number of fire control channels available is five, primarily because trainable directors (e.g. the Seawolf 911 or Seadart 909) provide ~ 90% of fire control channels, and each director generally controls an engagement against a single target usually controlling two SAMs. MFRs make up 6% of fire control channels (e.g. APAR, EMPAR), which are able to control multiple engagements and multiple missiles in concurrent engagements. The remainder are a combination of trainable directors and MFRs (e.g. Aegis, with SPY-1s and SPG-62s), normally using the MFR to control the engagement through the mid phase, with the trainable directors controlling the end phase. 

The maximum engagement range of a SAM is a difficult figure to work with, often because the published ranges are not the same as the maximum engagement range. Often, manufacturers quote maximum ballistic range, which is how far the missile will go on a ballistic trajectory from the launcher, using all the available energy in the missile. This figure is often far greater than the actual maximum engagement range. In reality, since most engagements will be against ASMs, they will occur within 20km from the Air Defence Platform, hence the maximum engagement range is somewhat of a misnomer against ASMs. 
 
In search of a coherent air picture
The air picture compilation is the ability of a system to develop and maintain a coherent air picture based upon Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) metrics. The ability for Sampson to achieve this will be kept close to the chests of the RN operators who use the system. However, a comment from recent tests with the USN was: ‘Yes we [Sampson] out-performed the USN in air picture compilation by some considerable extent.’ Enough said on that point. 

Comparison of the remaining attributes is difficult, due to the secrecy surrounding these sorts of figures. In terms of maximum track numbers, while many basic systems have maximum track numbers in single to double figures, a number of open sources quote that Aegis can quote a couple of hundred targets, whereas Sea Vipers’ track load capability is much closer to 1000 tracks, with inherent expandability to increase this number. 

The last four listed attributes are primarily a function of the ability of the available sensors and are very sensitive qualities. For radar sensors, the attributes enabling these qualities is clutter rejection (sub-clutter visibility), sensitivity and tracking capability. The nature of the array designs and the incorporation of some of the most advanced algorithms available allow Sampson to excel in these areas. 

In summary, this article has discussed questions on failures, origin of technology and overall system capability. It is clear, while failures have occurred; none has been systemic, which gives a positive indication of the reliability of the system. Again, the system origin is inherently British, with some foreign implementations, which, in the current world environment, is entirely acceptable. Finally, if one were to address questions related to capability – it can be said that Sea Viper is capable.
 
The numerous tests and trials have proven it, the war games the RN have undertaken have proven it, but unfortunately, the real data to prove this to the media is very sensitive, hence the reluctance to release them. However, during recent engagements with the USN, a comment from a USN officer was "That ship’s capabilities are awesome", which, in itself (when the US are the masters of air defence with AEGIS), is a profound statement of capability. 
 


Nick Young Contributor:   Nick Young

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