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Disaster in Den Haag: What Are We Learning from Dutch Defence Cuts?

Contributor:  Defence Dateline Group
Posted:  05/10/2011  12:00:00 AM EDT  |  0

Rate this Article: (4.0 Stars | 8 Votes)

Tags:   Netherlands | cuts | budget | MBT | Cougar | Leopard | helicopter | frigate | F-16 | JSF | Dutch | ISAF | Afghanistan

On 8 April Hans Hillen, Defence Minister of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, presented plans to re-structure the Dutch armed forces so as to “lower costs and increase efficiency”. In an almost comically candid choice of title, the Government paper; ‘A Smaller Military in a Troubled World’, drastically lowers both the size and ambition of the Dutch armed forces.

The result? Cuts that will include 12,000  personnel (from a total of 61,000), 60 Leopard MBT’s (the entire fleet), 30% of the general staff, 17 Cougar helicopters and a third of the air-force’s F-16’s. Worse still, planned reductions in both capabilities and personnel aimed at clawing back €1b of savings from a defence budget of €8.5b by 2014 have not yet been fully accounted for. In effect, future contract cancellations worth €325m can also be expected to make up the difference.

With national debt as a percentage of GDP hovering around 75%, Den Haag had little choice but to balance its books. However, spurred on by non-committal public support for the military and the political fall-out of the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan last year, the Dutch defence establishment has taken a budgetary beating. The Netherlands has acknowledged a painful reality also facing several of Europe’s medium sized powers: the permanent loss of core operational capabilities, with no hope of replacement for decades to come. How did Den Haag end up facing the loss of 1/5th of its military personnel, and what does this austerity budget foreshadow for the rest of Europe?
 
      
       This Dutch M1A1 Abrams MBT was one of the few tank platforms to survive cuts

Atlantic ambitions and over-seas commitments - The Dutch strategic concept

Former NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns once joked that the international image of The Netherlands as a globally engaged country was because, “as a small country, we have a relatively large ‘abroad’!” Indeed, one intriguing aspect of the recent capability cuts is that, for a nation of just 16m people, ensconced since the Cold War between strong allies and economic prosperity; The Netherlands has traditionally been an enthusiastic international security actor. A founding member of NATO, Dutch forces have also contributed to 28 UN-mandated military missions since 1947, from Korea to Somalia. They have even deployed under the EU banner three times since 2004; in Bosnia, Chad and the EUNAVFOR anti-piracy mission.

Perhaps most importantly, the Dutch people have been genuine believers in and beneficiaries of European experiments in collective security. By casting a fair share of their diplomatic and economic weight behind NATO, the UN and the EU, The Netherlands have kept a seat at the table of global security affairs, despite its relatively small size. Indeed discounting the recent ambivalence over Afghanistan, when polled, 80% of the Dutch population still say they would support military action in a case of genocide, and 71% whenever the United Nations decided that it is necessary. That’s quite a global vision for a mid-sized European country.

Lowering ambitions in the Low Countries
 
Given this, the current state of Dutch defence could come as a surprise. How could a country with such a strong political commitment to projecting force with its partners allow the military establishment to become so degraded? The answer may be found in a decade’s long list of misjudged reform decisions and unanticipated operational commitments. 
 
Faced with ageing equipment and increased occurrences of distant, but costly, international interventions, Den Haag was relatively quick to address the need for reform after the 1990’s. In a 2000 defence white paper, The Netherlands made some difficult (and necessary) choices about the size and shape of its armed forces. The clear winner was the navy, which despite losing half a dozen frigates and mine-hunters, was permitted to procure a fleet of new helicopters and to equip their work-horse Zeven Provinciën-class frigates with Tomahawk cruise missiles. In a remarkable commitment, the air force was also compensated for losing 25% of its F-16’s by the decision (in 1997) to buy-in to the JSF programme, to the tune of 86 aircraft.
 
Conversely, the army was the clear loser. Not only were troop numbers reduced by almost a third (facilitated by the end of compulsory conscription in 1996) but 136 Leopard-2 tanks, well over 60% of the standing total, were scrapped. This new 26 battalion and all-volunteer military was clearly expected to operate in a low intensity, peace-keeping/building environment, in which any serious kinetic capabilities were to be provided by accompanying allies. It was a bold and seemingly well designed plan, which rationalised those capabilities the military could not afford in exchange for keeping what they truly needed.
 
Death by a thousand cuts
 
However, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent military actions would quickly prove the 2000 review a strategic miscalculation. Within three years, the Dutch found themselves deploying 2,000 troops and the majority of their remaining armour in Iraq. By 2005, participation in ISAF was stretching deployable infantry man-power to its limits. Faced with a spiraling operational budget for the army and no reserve equipment, procurement programmes for the navy, such as the BGM-109 Tomahawk missile, were unceremoniously cancelled in 2005. Despite an increase in defence spending of 8% to cover the emerging spending gap, the military found legacy programmes such as the Stridsfordon 90 infantry fighting vehicles coming on-stream from 2006 onwards, with no budget to train the crews.
 
      
       In 2010 only 25 of 87 Dutch F-16s were actually operational
 
Then came the financial crisis, and what was initially a budgetary dilemma became a disaster. After years of cover-ups, the air-force was forced to admit in 2010 that only 25 of their 87 F-16’s were actually operational, due to parts shortages. Later, a damming spending review indicated that the Government’s emergency response promise to make 3,600 troops available within 48 hours of a major flooding incident was “impossible with current cash-flows.” As Dutch debt spiraled, already unpopular commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere started to draw serious public criticism.
 
The situation finally turned ugly in the Parliament. In an undoubted low-point in Dutch-NATO relations, their military involvement in ISAF was summarily cancelled, when the Government collapsed during the debate to extend the mission’s mandate in 2010. More recently, the begrudging revelation that The Netherlands’ expenditure for the JSF would cost €1.2 billion more then expected was compounded by a Wikileaks scandal revolving around the purchase of two test aircraft. This scandal rumbles on; opponents of the deal smell blood, and are arguing that a lack of Government transparency surrounding the deal should lead to the complete cancellation of Dutch involvement in the programme.
 
Out of this political and financial whirlwind, the painful cuts unveiled in ‘A Smaller Military in a Troubled World’ were not a reasoned response. They were the only option left.
 
A silver lining?
 
In many respects, the Dutch experience of defence reform is extreme, but not unique. Many British or French observers will sympathise with the mistaken shift away from high-intensity infantry operations prior to Iraq and Afghanistan. The eye-watering budget inflation of legacy programmes such as the JSF and the lethargic Government response to a growing spending gap are also fairly typical. Regardless, it is difficult to argue that losing the entire MBT fleet and a 1/5th of Dutch military personnel is anything less then a disaster for Den Haag.
 
However, while these cuts certainly represent a lowering of ambition, there is amongst the wreckage signs of how The Netherlands intends to continue contributing to international military operations, namely, the navy.
 
In terms of surface ships, the Koninklijke Marine’s share of the cuts is fairly limited. Pre-existing agreements to sell up to five Alkmaar-class minesweepers to Latvia have spared the pride of the Dutch navy - its six strong frigate squadron - from any further decommissions. Indeed, with three De Zeven Provinciën-class air defence and command frigates currently operating as part of EUNAVFOR, the Dutch seem willing to carry a disproportionately large share of the naval workload of European missions.
 
Moreover, of the 20 NH90 helicopters that remain on order, 12 will be in NATO Frigate Helicopter configurations, and the remaining eight marinised troop transport and utility variants. Add to this the expected delivery of a further six CH-47F Chinooks, marine formations unaffected by personnel cuts and two Rotterdam-class Landing Platform Docks, the Dutch will thus retain a modest but highly deployable amphibious capability, as well as a versatile platform for Special Forces.
 
Despite lowered force numbers on land, the Dutch seem likely to continue to punch above their weight at sea, a valuable role amongst European allies running chronically short of shipping tonnage.
 
Lessons for Europe - find your niche
 
This may seem a tarnished silver lining, but it illustrates the new reality that faces European military establishments. Den Haag attempted to maintain token representations of a full-spectrum force, and have proceeded to push their defence structures to the edge of ruin. Faced with a genuine need to completely scrap certain assets, The Netherlands has fallen back onto its most strategically useful capability for its equally over-stretched allies: naval power. For MBT’s and jets, the Dutch have consented to rely on someone else.
 
This is not a situation any military wishes to face, but it is a realistic one for many of Europe’s medium sized powers. Across the continent, similar documents to ‘A Smaller Military in a Troubled World’ are being drawn up. Whilst one cannot say for certain where the axe will fall, by looking at where individual nations have above average capacity; be it on land, sea or air, it may be possible to predict how future defence reform announcements will affect European militaries.
 
Clearly, the time has come to find a safe niche. Otherwise, piecemeal reform blunders will continue to degrade Europe’s overall military power. 
 


Defence Dateline Group Contributor:   Defence Dateline Group

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