Lessons from Afghanistan: Policy presentation

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Although the struggle in Afghanistan is far from over it is possible to draw lessons from Britain’s involvement thus far which may prove of use in future crises.  In the first of a series of reflections on such lessons this article will consider how Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) presented it’s Afghanistan policy to the British public in an effort to capture popular support for the endeavour.

Background

The commitment of British forces to Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States (US) attracted little public interest or opposition, a military reaction to 9/11 was unsurprising and it was largely a Special Forces (SF) affair conducted beyond the public gaze. After the subsequent defeat of the Taliban regime an international conference at Bonn in December 2001 committed a coalition force to Afghanistan but again with minimal public concern; the Taliban had been swiftly defeated, the number of troops deployed remained relatively small, casualties were rare, and with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 public attention focused elsewhere.  Put simply, the government did not need to invest much effort in explaining it’s Afghanistan policy because few people cared about it. However, this situation was to change dramatically in 2006.    

The Bonn-rooted international plan for Afghanistan required a phased expansion of the new Afghan government’s authority across the rest of the country.  Fanning out from Kabul in an anti-clockwise progression, the United Nations (UN) mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed into Afghan Provinces to facilitate that governance. This move attracted little opposition in the North and West of the country but in the Pashtun South provinces bordering Pakistan were under greater Taliban influence and proved more restive. So when the UK deployed a Task Force to Pashtun Helmand in 2006 it not only substantially increased the size of the British force in Afghanistan but also the probability of greater conflict and casualties. Afghanistan was no longer a national commitment that could be neglected or ignored.

Following the politically toxic 2003 war in Iraq, the incumbent Labour government needed greater public support for the growing military commitment in Afghanistan. Any hope of a peaceable focus quickly evaporated in the Afghan heat, and as Helmand rapidly became a cauldron of intense combat with rising casualties questions about the UK intervention in Afghanistan (and opposition to it) grew.  Effective action was required to keep the British public ‘onside’.       

Stressing Homeland Security

The principal effort Labour made to ‘connect’ the British public to it’s Afghan venture has been continued by the present coalition government and stresses how the war in Afghanistan makes Britain safer from terrorist attack by removing a proven Al-Qaeda haven where terrorists could plan, train and prepare for attacks. There are some advantages to this approach: first, it dismisses the question of why British troops are fighting so far from home - they are doing so for domestic motives; second, it deals with objections to the cost of the intervention, invoking a cause that justifies an extreme investment in blood and treasure; third, it personalises the conflict as the intervention is stressed to be on behalf of all British citizens, and finally, it is a simple message (‘we’ are in Afghanistan to defend the UK) so it should be easily assimilated and generally understood. 

The widespread employment of this message by politicians, government officials and military personnel creates an impression of apparent utility which is deceiving for it has patently failed to silence criticism of the intervention, and in repeated polling the British public remains largely unsupportive or opposed to HMG’s Afghanistan policy. 

Undoubtedly, the appeal to homeland defence/security has created some popular support for the endeavour by fuelling patriotic sympathies but it is rather limited in scope and effect, failing to generate either the widespread backing or enduring popular commitment that eases the lingering pressure on government policy. Ultimately, as a motive for intervention in Afghanistan, homeland security suffered from too many problems to be an adequate lever on public opinion.

Problems with Homeland Security as a justification

As Afghanistan is many thousands of miles from the UK and it has not featured in the national psyche since a colonial war over 80 years ago, the common question ‘why are we in Afghanistan?’ could not be ignored. The British public rightly needed convincing that the intervention was justified and deserved its support, but in addressing that question too many officials and commentators have assumed that a pithy answer is required. Reducing the issues at stake in such an important policy matter to a simple logic which people can remember is a mistake. Going to war in Afghanistan should be a compelling decision because there are a number of important strategic reasons for doing so, and the more the better. A reductionist approach to explaining HMG’s position may seem an attractive way to communicate policy but placing more emphasis on simplicity than persuasion is counter-productive. The British public is not unintelligent so weight of evidence and convincing arguments are more likely to produce broad and enduring support than pithy sound bites that neglect significant factors with bearing on the matter.   

Building a case for intervention in Afghanistan which has popular traction is not easy as intervention is a strategic policy and strategic decisions focus on national, not individual, interests. This means that key issues may deservedly drive a strategic policy but have no direct bearing on individual citizens, undermining their influence on popular opinion.  When strategic factors direct or motivate government policy it is therefore essential to explain how connected national interests indirectly benefit all citizens. For example, the international intervention in Afghanistan was a UN mandated mission and as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council the UK has an indispensable stake in upholding the authority and credibility of the UN and it’s Resolutions. Not committing forces to ISAF would have undermined Britain’s position in the UN, it’s national reputation, diplomatic influence and international relations, but these are not concerns many citizens would feel are personally important. Similarly, the need to deal with ungoverned areas that could fuel instability in nuclear-armed Pakistan is a strategic imperative that exercises little leverage over British public opinion. A political reluctance to draw on such matters when arguing for Britain’s participation in ISAF does not remove their importance or validity, and the neglect of such factors has seriously weakened the case for UK involvement.   

The attempt to make Afghanistan personally relevant to every British citizen as a security issue was understandable but fundamentally flawed. Terrorist training camps were indeed expelled from Afghanistan by the international intervention but not from the Pashtun dominated Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan, or from other ungoverned regions in the Middle East and North Africa where Al-Qaeda and other groups continue to facilitate terrorist activities free from ISAF interference. Terrorist funding, recruitment, training, planning and preparation can all be sourced elsewhere. The adverse impact foreign effort in Afghanistan has had on international terrorism has more to do with casualties among extremists who flocked to Afghanistan to fight ISAF than the displacement of Al-Qaeda training camps. Even ignoring the inconvenient fact that extremists could use Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan to cultivate recruits within the UK, public statements from UK security services indicate there has been no shortage of terrorist activity in the UK since 2006; the lack of violent attacks since then has been the result of significant police and intelligence efforts, not the bravery of British troops in Helmand. The idea that Afghanistan was crucial to the future of international terrorism is unsustainable and HMG has been fortunate that events have not exposed the fragility of ‘homeland security’ as the foundation on which to build public support for it’s Afghan endeavour.  

Paradoxically, the continuing absence of a major terrorist attack in the UK does not generate growing support for the notion that the expeditionary defence of homeland security is working. Rather, the longer people feel safe the less emphasis they place on security.  It is danger, not safety, that raises public interest in security and so as the Afghan campaign continues year on year homeland security loses traction as a motive for involvement. Instead, support (or not) for the intervention rests more on what people perceive to be happening in Helmand, and whether that justifies the growing cost in British blood and treasure. This reinforces the need to connect Afghanistan, not domestic concern, to the national interest.    

Conclusion

It is unclear whether HMG adopted defence of the UK as it’s raison d’Être for intervening militarily in Afghanistan because it selected this reason above all others or because it failed to derive additional motives. Homeland security is a pithy and moral, yet fragile and dubious, motive for a discretionary intervention so far from home.  It did provide a welcome totem for politicians and officials to rally round but it suffers from an intellectual and practical vulnerability.  It was also used to the exclusion of other factors which justifiably called for UK participation in the international effort to revive Afghanistan. Despite its appeal to a moral cause that warrants shouldering casualties, the vindication for such losses would have been more convincing had a combination of reasons been employed to form a compelling argument for intervention. This combination should have included defence of the UK but not as a principal factor. Lessons to be drawn since 2006 which might be of use in future crises include:

• Stress strategic policy drivers, even if they appear remote from individual citizen’s concerns. Do not elevate tactical incidents or considerations to the same level.
• Emphasise what comprises the national interest. Ultimate benefits for the majority should outweigh temporary advantages for a minority.
• Do not attempt to communicate justification for an expeditionary intervention until robust national interests have been established and agreed within HMG. Do not be afraid to review these vital interests over time if the strategic situation changes. A responsive yet convincing justification is better than a dogmatic one with no force.
• Build a compelling case for an expeditionary intervention, not a pithy one. Achieving a weight of argument in support of government policy is more important than avoiding the risk that multiple motives may dilute or confuse public opinion.
• Apply rigorous analysis to motives and chosen messages before exposing them to the public.  Think first, communicate later. Time spent on analysis is not wasted. 

Contributor:   Paul Smyth

Paul Smyth has a 30-year career profile spanning a rare mix of military and think-tank employment.  His experience encompasses crisis management, planning expertise, performance setting and assessment, operational and combat experience, research and analysis, strategic liaison, international collaboration and media commentary.  He is currently the owner of R3I Consulting (http://www.r3iconsulting.com/)

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