Fear and defiance: What next for Syria?

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By Laurence Conneely

Events surrounding the crisis in Syria are rapidly unfolding and changing amid an escalation of the violence that has swept the country since March 2011. A second United Nations Security Council resolution has fallen by the wayside following a defiant Russia-China veto; the United States has closed its embassy in Damascus, and following suit we have seen the exodus of a number of European and Gulf State ambassadors, including those of France and the United Kingdom. A violent crackdown in the restive city of Homs is descending into one of the bloodiest assaults Syria has seen since the Hama Massacre in February 1982.

All of this begs the question – what options remain for international community?

The UNSC now appears to be a dead end. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has declared it a ‘neutered’ entity and even the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has admitted that the failure of the second draft resolution has ‘undermined the role of the United Nations’. The positions of China and Russia appear to have been made clear: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has asserted that the fate of Syria must be decided by the Syrian people, and that any attempt to initiate foreign intervention through the UNSC would never be approved.

Yet the failure of this latest resolution does not mean that the United Nations’ security machinery is no longer a useful tool. Using the power of the UN General Assembly to put further pressure on Assad’s regime is a likely next step. Combining a strong UN stance with further European Union sanctions, against precious metals imports for example, or an asset freeze on the Central Bank of Syria, would place the Assad regime in an increasingly precarious position. The EU’s foreign ministers are set to meet on February 27^th, where the possibility of these and other sanctions will be discussed.

Unfortunately, the diplomatic and economic route so far has proved to be little more than a thorn in the side of the Assad regime, and the lack of a united front in the face of the increasing brutality displayed toward the civilian population of Syria means that while draining in the long-term, further sanctions alone will not achieve a significant shift in the balance of power on the ground.

Military intervention has, so far, remained resolutely off the cards not only for those wishing to maintain their economic and political ties with the Assad regime, but also for those countries calling for his abdication. However, US Central Command, under the leadership of Gen. James Mattis, is preparing military contingency plans. The Arab League’s role in any military operation would be extremely important; not only as contributors or hosts of any air forces involved in enforcing a theoretical no-fly zone or the protection of civilians, but also as the principal arbiters between the Arab world, the United States, the EU and NATO. This was the case in Libya, and was crucial in gaining and sustaining regional support for a Western-led intervention in an Arab state.

However, military intervention against the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) is not an option that will be undertaken at all lightly. Bashar al-Assad, as President of Syria, retains ultimate control of 304,000 active army, navy and air force personnel, with a further 342,500 in reserve. Its equipment has seen recent modernization as part of the ongoing arms deal with Russia, including MiG-29M fighters. Its armoured fighting vehicles, some currently being deployed against civilians and Free Syrian Army (FSA) units in Homs, include over 2,000 T-72M and T-80 tanks, many recently upgraded by Russia. The military effort against Colonel Gaddafi by contrast faced around 50,000 volunteer and conscript fighters, with an additional 8,000 navy and 22,000 air force personnel, all armed with severely under-maintained and ageing Soviet-era equipment, including a few hundred 1970s-era MiG and Sukhoi aircraft. Any military deployment against the SAF would need a concerted material and manpower contribution far exceeding that deployed against Libya, and the option of restricting it to an air power-only campaign remains extremely unlikely, given the vital role of Syrian ground forces in the repression. In fact, the magnitude of such an operation is likely beyond the commitment any country is willing to make in support of the disparate Syrian opposition, and the repeated assertion that military intervention is not an option must stem from this reality.

The Alawite Shia sect domination of the SAF is also cause for concern. 70% of career soldiers, around 140,000, and 80% of officers are estimated to be Alawite, despite only making up 12% of the wider Syrian population. The promotion and favouritism shown to this minority sect by the al-Assad regime has created a power-base which should prove extremely difficult to destabilise. So far the unrest has not been especially sectarian, but there are clear divides between the Alawite supporters of Assad and his Sunni opponents which would likely deepen following both military intervention and from arming opposition groups. A sectarian war and the accompanying descent into further widespread violence would likely set back prospects for a democratic Syria for some time.

What are we left with after these options have been exhausted? Diplomatic means outside the UN may offer a distinct ‘Third Way’ between standard UNSC measures and outright military intervention. Hillary Clinton has called for the creation of a “friends of a democratic Syria” group who can kickstart the political process and create a new dialogue discussing reform and regime transition away from those continuing to shore-up support for Assad. The most important role such a group has to offer would be the ability to co-ordinate and unify the myriad different opposition groups and voices currently in operation in and outside Syria. A unified opposition is key to facing down the threat posed by the SAF, and one which has so far failed to materialise. Despite the factionalism now disrupting the post-war Libya, when faced with the determination of Colonel Gaddafi’s armed forces, the Free Libyan Army presented a surprisingly resilient, unified opposition movement under the political leadership of the National Transitional Council, one that crossed tribal and regional fractures that have only re-emerged in the post-war context.

No such unity exists among the desperate opposition groups in Syria. Until recently the two principal actors were the Free Syrian Army, composed of SAF and security service defectors and local volunteers, and the partially-recognised ‘government-in-exile’, the Syrian National Council (SNC), both based in Turkey. The head of the FSA, Riad al-Asaad, is a well-respected former Colonel, formerly of the Syrian Air Force, but is geographically remote from his forces and communication with local units is difficult to say the least. Burhan Ghalioun, a highly regarded Syrian political scientist based in Paris was, as of Monday 6^thFebruary, the president of the SNC but his future is uncertain following calls for his removal, amidst growing criticism of his leadership, and the tactics of the SNC under his rule.

Hopefully progress can be made on the co-ordination of these opposition groups, especially towards the creation of a truly representative umbrella organisation. Arming such a group presents one option, whether directly or, for example, indirectly through neighbouring Arab states. At the current time this option remains open where military intervention does not, but it is still a very contentious issue. It also remains highly unlikely that even a directly armed opposition faction could face down the SAF, especially with no territorial control. Further financial and political pressure on the Assad regime, combined with the confident manoeuvres of a unified opposition could enable the conditions for a ceasefire and some sort of movement towards transition or a transfer of power. Whether even these restrained goals can be achieved however remains to be seen.

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Contributor:   Defence Dateline Group

Defence Dateline Group

Internal UK and European defence analytics

For military decision makers, industry stakeholders and the fighting men and women of Europe, understanding the state of European defence is a top priority. In this regular column, the Defence Dateline Group will explore Europe’s defence dilemmas: asking the tough questions, shining a light on the biggest issues and providing you with the “food for thought” you need to tackle the challenges ahead.

The Group

Tom Wein – Editor

Tom is a defence industry and strategy analyst with experience in the Middle East and strategic communications. He has worked as a project manager for Strategic Communication Laboratories, and published numerous policy papers and articles.

Robert Knapp – Columnist

Robert is a regular foreign affairs and defence contributor to BN magazine, with his principal areas of focus being naval strategy, European defence procurement and 20th century maritime history.

Laurence Conneely – Columnist

Laurence is currently studying for an MSc in Violence, Conflict & Development at the School of Oriental and African studies, with a particular focus on contested governance, geopolitics and insurgent & separatist movements across the Indian Subcontinent, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

David Moroz – Columnist

David is a former RAF reservist and War Studies graduate. His areas of interest include air power, British defence policy and the Second World War in Europe.

You can contact Defence Dateline Group and its members here.

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